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Abstract Budgeting—i.e. the decision on the level of expenditures and on the repartition
of resources among organizational subunits—can be conceived as a critical organizational
process, which is closely related to key choices concerning strategic priorities and to
resources acquisition strategies. Overall, it is increasingly being recognized as one of the
central places where steering and governance take place, and where higher education
institutions are supposed to take initiative. Accordingly, this paper pursues two aims: first,
it provides a review of existing studies about budgeting in higher education, according to
the literature on changes in its organizational characteristics, and with a focus on
approaches from Organizational Theory and Sociology. Second, it identifies some future
directions of research, thus easing the integration of these two bodies of literature. This
integration may help in providing researchers with a deeper understanding of the current
functioning of budgeting processes, their variations across higher education institutions
and countries, as well as their implications for organizational behavior.
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Introduction
It is impossible to overestimate the importance of budgeting in public and private orga-
nizations, as well as in public administration (Wildavsky 2002). Critically, budgeting
provides for the repartition of resources to organisational subunits thus impacting on their
activities and creating incentives for actors’ behaviour (Gautier and Wauthy 2007). At the
level of the whole organization, budgeting can be recognized as a central element in the
organizational control systems that keep a balance between revenues and expenditures,
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manage the resources interface with the environment, and reduce uncertainty (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1974). Budgeting is also connected to strategic decision-making since imple-
mentation of strategies is likely to require also reallocation of financial means (Jarzab-
kowski 2002). Budgeting is also a central variable in the consideration of internal power
balance. Endowment of resources flowing from budgetary outcomes can be seen as a signal
of power with broad impacts on internal power balances, while reciprocally, departmental
power can itself be used to acquire resources (Salancik and Pfeffer 1974). Finally, the
process of budgeting is a cultural and symbolic act, which displays and enacts organiza-
tional goals and norms through selective allocation of resources (Lascoumes and Le Gales
2007). Budgeting is thus not only an instrument to legitimize organizations with respect to
important institutional players in their environments, but also to maintain organizational
identity and to promote collective action.
With respect to higher education institutions (hereafter HEIs), existing studies con-
cerning budgeting mostly analyse one or a few individual institutions, and focus on single
issues, like the role of power (Pfeffer and Moore 1980) or the impact of national funding
systems on budgeting (Jongbloed 2007). These works are related to different traditions—
Economics, Organizational Studies, Accounting, Higher Education Studies—and thus it is
difficult to get an overview that might highlight similarities and differences among them.
This paper is based on on-going work in the EUROHESC project about the transfor-
mation of universities in Europe (TRUE). Its aim is first to review existing studies of higher
education budgeting—with a focus on approaches from organizational theory and soci-
ology—in light of the literature on changes in the organizational characteristics of HEIs.
The second aim of this paper is to identify some future directions of research, which would
facilitate the integration of these two bodies of literature. It is hoped that such an inte-
gration will provide researchers with a deeper understanding of the current functioning of
HEI budgeting processes, their variations across HEI and countries and their implications
for organizational behavior overall.
We realize this program as follows. In Sect. 2 of the paper, we provide a descriptive
analysis of budgeting processes, highlighting their connections with other organizational
characteristics of HEIs and introducing some basic dimensions for comparative analysis. In
Sect. 3, we review existing studies of HEIs’ budgeting processes organized according to
their underlying theoretical conceptions of organizations and actors’ behavior. In the two
following sections, we highlight two directions of research, focusing on the relationship
between organizational restructuring of HEIs and budgeting (Sect. 4), as well as on
organizational responses to changes in national funding systems (Sect. 5). We conclude the
paper with some broad remarks on the significance of the study of budgeting for higher
education studies overall.
Budgeting in higher education institutions: a general description
In its simplest way, budgeting can be defined as an organizational process through which
centrally available financial resources are divided among organizational subunits and type
of expenditures (Jongbloed and van der Knoop 1999). In almost all cases, its outcome will
be a formal document specifying the level of resources allocated for a given period of
time—in most cases the following year. Budgeting has thus to be carefully distinguished
from accounting, where expenditures incurred in a given period of time are reported.
In most countries, HEI funding is composed by two main approaches (Lepori et al.
2007; Jongbloed 2008). In the first, resources are attributed to the HEI as a whole and then
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distributed internally to subunits (core budget). In the second, resources are earmarked to
specific activities and subunits (third-party funding). The former is mostly composed of the
basic operational grant from the State, supplemented in most cases by undergraduate fees,
donations and other general revenues. Third-party funding is generally composed of public
research grants, private contract funds, postgraduate fees and other earmarked revenues.
As typically defined, budgeting at the HEI level concerns only the core budget, while
third-party funds—even if included in institutional accounts—are under the responsibility
of subunits. However, since many activities are funded through both sources, there are
interdependencies between the two streams of resources. For example, some research
grants might accrue overheads directly to an HEI to cover the general costs of conducting
research on university premises. Conversely, many HEI have developed policies where the
provision of core funding is partially related to the acquisition of third-party funds. Policies
concerning the management of third-party funds, as well as the share of the two streams of
resources, might thus have a strong impact on institutional budgeting, an issue which has
been hardly addressed in past studies.
Given its centrality in organizational life, an analysis of budgeting can take different
perspectives. In the following, we present four perspectives which emphasize: (1) the
material side—budgeting as a tool to distribute scarce resources, (2) the relationship of
budgeting to organizational actors and their interests, (3) the procedural, rule-based
dimension and, (4) the relationships of budgeting with broader cultural dimensions and
social norms.
Budgeting as part of the resources flow
In its material dimension, budgeting is a part of the economic cycle wherein the HEI
acquires resources from different sources and divides them among organizational sub-
units—faculties, departments, research centers, services—in order to realize activities
which potentially lead to the acquisition of further resources. This direct connection with
the material environment is a distinctive characteristic of budgeting, which differentiates it
from other organizational processes such as strategizing. However this connection also
raises issues of rivalry among institutional subunits vying for scarce resources and of the
optimal allocation of resources in order to achieve organizational goals (Massy 1996b).
This perspective also highlights the close relationship between resource acquisition and
the structure of the resource environment, as two central functions of budgeting are to keep
a balance between revenues and expenditures. Thus, budgeting has a dual function; as an
instrument to internally allocate resources, but also as a tool to acquire resources by
making different types of claims on the State (Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988).
Accordingly, a central factor to be taken into account in the analysis of HEI budgeting
and its variations is the structure of the resource space and, especially, of variations in
public higher education funding. One approach here is to highlight the differences in the
composition of resources with respect to countries and individual HEIs. For example, at the
European level, third-party funds account on average for 21 % of revenues, but this share
exceeds 30 % in a number of countries, and rises as high as 40 % of the total revenues in
some cases (Lepori et al. 2007). These differences are related to national-level variations in
the composition of funding (Lepori et al. 2007), but variations can also be attributed to
different capacities of individual HEIs to attract third-party funds. A second approach
highlights allocation processes. In most European countries the basic operational grant
constitutes the largest part of the total HEI budget—with the partial exception of UK
(Lepori et al. 2007). Accordingly, the level of these grants and the criteria for their
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allocation are highly relevant when studying internal budgeting. Despite wide national
differences, comparative studies display a general shift away from soft allocation based on
inputs and on political negotiations towards more formalised rules where funding is based
on measures of activities (e.g. students numbers) and, to a less extent, outputs such as
research outputs and degrees (Jongbloed 2008).
Actors and their role in the budgeting process
The actor’s perspective looks at budgeting as a process wherein different organizational
actors negotiate and take decisions concerning the repartition of resources. It thus
emphasizes issues such as which actors are involved in the process, their role and power in
decision-making, and the grounds upon which they make decisions. Approaches to bud-
geting differ critically in their underlying assumptions about organizational actors, their
agency and level of rationality.
Assuming an actor’s perspective also relates the study of budgeting to the analysis of
governance and organizational structure of HEIs. Much of the budgeting literature has
adopted a view of HEIs as coalitions of departments and, accordingly, considered heads of
departments as the main actors in the process (Salancik and Pfeffer 1974). However, this
assumption needs to be reconsidered in view of the processes of hierarchization and
strengthening of the central management which have taken place in the last decades in
HEIs (Amaral 2003). Given the technical nature of budgeting and its relationships with
accounting and financial management, the parallel process of strengthening and profes-
sionalization of the central administration also deserves close investigation. In this respect
we consider that, rather than adhering to a clear-cut organizational model—e.g. coalitional
versus centralized, it will be more relevant to investigate issues of balance of power and of
how variations in budgeting are related to differences among HEIs in their internal
organizational structures (see Jarzabkowski 2002).
A further relevant dimension explores organizational structure with respect to division
into subunits and the definition of budgetary units. Traditionally, the higher education
literature has adhered to a representation of HEIs as being organized in two levels, namely
a first level of broad disciplinary groupings, such as departments, and a second level of
more fine-grained units focused on specific subject areas (chairs, research centres, etc.;
Clark 1983). This leads to a parallel two-level organization of budgeting where depart-
mental budgets are decided at the central level, while chairs and research groups are
budgeted at the departmental level. While this approach might still hold in many cases,
some HEIs have undertaken organizational restructuring during recent years providing
budgetary autonomy to schools or research centres (see Moll 2004 for an Australian case)
or adopting matrix structures with distinct organizational units for research and education
with separate budgets. Accurate charting of the budget structure as an outcome of the
overall HEI organization may thus required on case by case basis.
Finally, a central question within this perspective concerns the changing role of the
State in HEI budgeting processes, as in the European context HEI budgets move away from
being part of the larger public administration budget and thus subject to direct State
decision and control. As we shall discuss later, this question is closely related to the extent
to which HEIs can be considered as formal organizations with a defined boundary to their
wider environment (including, the State itself).
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Procedures and allocation rules: the regulative dimension
The procedural and rule-based perspective focuses on the systems of formal rules con-
straining the decisions of the actors in the budgeting processes and thus provides a
framework within which the largely behavioral actions of the complementary actor’s and
power perspectives adhere. In organizational terms, it constitutes the regulatory pillar of
the institutional environment (Scott 2008). As highlighted by Max Weber, formalization
and rationalization are lasting change processes characterizing modern societies, where
increasingly, authority and decisions have to be grounded in explicit (and rationally-
justifiable) rules (see Meyer and Rowan 1977).
For analytical purposes, it useful to distinguish between procedural and substantive
rules concerning budgeting. The former define the steps through which the budget is
elaborated, refined, approved and finally implemented, as well as the actors involved in
each step and their role (e.g. defining voting rights). Organizational economics considers
procedures—like other organizational routines—as lasting and constitutive elements of
organizations, which largely determine their behaviour and way of responding to external
changes (Becker 2003). While budgeting in HEIs has been traditionally represented as a
largely unstructured process based on informal negotiations, it is generally considered that
the transformation of HEIs towards formal organizations has also entailed the establish-
ment of internal systems of rules and procedures (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson 2000).
Substantive rules are those defining how the budget should be divided among organi-
zational subunits. These might include soft criteria, for example an understanding that units
with large numbers of students should get additional resources, but also formulas, wherein
allocations are calculated using some numerical parameters, for example the level of third-
party funding earned by each subunit. The introduction of formula funding is a widespread
trend at the level of higher education system (see Jongbloed 2008), but much less for
internal budgeting inside HEIs (see however for the Dutch case: Jongbloed 2007).
Finally, a related area concerns specific rules and procedures governing accounting and
reporting. These apparently technical aspects are highly relevant not only for insight into the
budgeting process and its outcomes but also as the instantiation of actors’ interests and power
relationships. Internal budgeting concerns categories of resources with different character-
istics and timeframes (for example, tenured positions vs. untenured). Critically, how the
budget is organised and accounted for—e.g. inclusion of social costs, appropriate depreci-
ation of capital assets—is not a purely technical issue, but is likely to impact on resources
allocation since it is through these procedures administrators may attempt to constrain
departmental power (Schick 1985) or to shape relationships with the State (Covaleski and
Dirsmith 1988). Hence, specific competences in accounting become key assets in budgetary
negotiation, both in terms of ability to provide and discuss budgetary figures and to provide
supporting legitimacy to propose how funding should be distributed (Ezzamel 1994).
Traditionally, university budgets have been considered as very opaque and difficult to
understand. However, pushed by new public management rationales, there has been
pressure toward more transparent accounting systems, for example, allowing more fine-
grained control of activities and costs through full-cost accounting (Jongbloed 2000; EUA
European University Association 2008).
Culture and social norms: the institutional dimension
A perspective on culture and social norms highlights the broader institutional context of
budgeting accounting for regularities in actor’s behaviour which goes beyond rational
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utility-based calculations (Scott 2001). Most approaches to budgeting share the view that
the institutional context is relevant for budgeting and extends further than the actual
content of regulations to include, for example, shared principles for allocation like equality
(everybody has the right to some level of funding) and efficiency (allocation should be
based on performance), conceptions of academic freedom, and the understanding of the
institutional mission and goals. However, theoretical approaches critically differ in how
they conceive of the relationships between institutional context and behaviour; between the
two extremes of considering institutions as external limitations to purposeful behaviour in
institutional economics (Williamson 2000) and considering actor’s behaviour as largely
determined by institutions in some neo-institutionalist approaches (Greenwood et al. 2008).
In the case of budgeting, relevant cultural and normative dimensions refer to different
organizational levels: some are related to the overall institutional environment of higher
education at the national level, including broader policy narratives on higher education like
new public management providing specific codes on how resources should be distributed
(Ferlie et al. 2008). Social norms can also be related to the specific culture of the con-
sidered HEI (Jarzabkowski 2002), for example, the importance of collegial versus mana-
gerial culture, or different representations of what a university is and how it should work.
In most HEIs, social norms related to budgeting are also likely to be different across
disciplinary and epistemic communities and this might well drive different expectations
regarding how resources should be distributed across organizational subunits, for example,
by assuming that there are specific levels of resource endowment per student for each
discipline that can be justified on the grounds of different didactic practices. In many
countries which introduced formula funding at the institutional level, these differences
have often been taken into account through different levels of State funding per head of
student and thus acquire stronger relevance for internal budgeting of universities both
because of their practical and their normative implications.
A review of the literature
In this section, budgeting is recognized first as a technical device employed in order to
implement organizational strategies and reach organizational goals, then as an intendedly
rational but behaviourally constrained approach, as a process of negotiation among
organisational actors competing for resources, as well as for power, and finally as a
cultural and symbolic act to enable social norms and values through money (Wildavsky
2002). These four approaches to budgeting are related to different models of organiza-
tions—the rational versus the garbage can versus the coalitional versus the institutionalised
model of organizations—and thus, they build upon the current scholarly debate on the
organizational transformation of universities (Musselin 2007; Bleiklie 2009).
Goal-oriented rationality and budgeting
The fundamental approach to budgeting can be characterized as the rational approach: in
this perspective, budgeting is an instrument in the hands of central administrators to
achieve organizational goals and manage environmental relationships (Jongbloed and van
der Knoop 1999). This approach assumes that HEIs are rational organizations with their
own hierarchy of objectives and that they try to maximize the achievement of these
objectives under environmental and resources constraints, taking also into account non-
substitutability of resources and the presence of large irreversibility (Bonaccorsi and
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Daraio 2007). This approach links budgeting to incentive systems, but also to strategic
decision-making (Jarzabkowski 2002).
In the rational approach, national funding systems set incentives for organizational
behaviour, while HEIs reshape their internal allocation to create incentives for organiza-
tional units in order to respond to policy pressures and, in particular, to performance-based
funding. The rational approach suggests purposeful behaviour: HEIs do not borrow
national funding schemes, but implement internal budgetary systems allowing them to best
answer to direct policy pressures, as documented in a study on Dutch HEIs (Jongbloed
2007).
In the literature, the rational model is mostly related to a view of organizations focusing
on functional interdependencies between subunits in the production process, emphasizing
the relevance of systemic power and rational planning for organizational success (Astley
and Zajac 1991).
To take into account the decentralized organization of universities, educational eco-
nomics has developed approaches to budgeting where responsibility is delegated to
organizational units, for example, establishing cost/profit centres and making them
responsible for profit and losses (Massy 1996b). The new public management literature
also points towards devolution of budgeting responsibility to departments, a pattern which
has been empirically demonstrated in some studies (Jarzabkowski 2002; Zahirul 2006).
A first approach, derived from the theory of multidivisional companies, is setting
incentives through the creation of internal markets (transfer pricing; Jongbloed and van der
Knoop 1999). Under conditions of maximization of profit of subunits, this approach allows
the modelling of how central management can influence the balance between research and
education through incentive schemes (Gautier and Wauthy 2007). A second approach is
grounded on principal-agent theory (for a review see Eisenhardt 1989). Principal-agent
represents central management and departments as independent actors with their own goals
acting to maximize their utility. Central management (as principal) delegates the execution
of organizational tasks—performing education and research—to departments in exchange
for the transfer of financial resources (Ferris 1992). Formalized applications of the theory
allow precise prediction of the expected allocation of resources if utility functions can be
specified as well as under equilibrium conditions. Such models are difficult to test in cases
of HEIs (Johnes 1999). However, softer versions of the theory that entail behavioural-
oriented predictions, such as that an increasing independence of the central management
should lead to increasing use of incentive schemes and control mechanism, are somewhat
open to be empirically tested through comparative studies.
Empirical evidence of rational budgeting is, at best, partial and contested. While some
studies show formalisation of the budgeting process, it is difficult to establish to which
extent this is related to the achievement of organizational goals, rather than to power and
social conformity, while there is evidence that formal and rational approaches go together
with a large deal of power-based negotiations (Thomas 2000). A study of a Canadian
university also shows that a rational approach to budgetary cuts might be dysfunctional
because of structural constraints—budgetary cuts are limited by the existence of tenured
positions—and because not taking into account the internal power balance makes it not
work in practice (Hardy 1988). Evidence that incentive schemes work as predicted by
economic theory – i.e. linking funding to performance – is documented in the case of
individual researchers (Laudel 2006), but is less apparent at the HEI level (see however
Jongbloed 2007). Issues of aggregation from the individual to the organizational level and,
relatedly, of the possibility of specifying a production function at the departmental or
organizational level, are lasting and contentious issues in educational economics.
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Bounded rationality and garbage cans: budgeting in an organized anarchy
We begin our critique of the rational budgeting process using the work of the Carnegie
group, which identified both cognitive deficiencies and behavioural irregularities such as
bounded rationality, satisficing and problemistic search which suggest that decision
making may be intendedly rational but that neither processes nor outcomes necessarily
follow the rational model (March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963). This work was
subsequently leveraged into what has become known as the Carnegie model of decision
making; the chief characteristic of which is coalition formation. Coalitions in organizations
arise for two reasons: First, organizational strategic goals are often ambiguous and
departmental operational goals are often inconsistent. The result is both uncertainty and
conflict. Decision-makers must therefore bargain among themselves to form coalitions
around shared goals, problem definitions and priorities. Second, human cognitive limits
and their behavioural consequences also contribute to coalition formation. Limits of time,
resources and attention contribute to bounded rationality. Satisfying—the acceptance of
satisfactory versus optimal solutions—takes place. Decision makers undertake problematic
search: they look for solutions in the immediate area of the problem instead of considering
a broad range of possible solutions. Coalitions allow decision makers to share information,
reduce ambiguity and build consensus.
These ideas have found application in budgetary research through the theory of (pro-
cess) incrementalism developed in a budgetary context by Wildavsky (1964). This theory
refers to a pattern of marginal change in final allocation outcomes relative to some known
base, typically the previous budget. The approach provides stable expectations for bud-
getary decision makers and reduces the burden of analysis for participants in the process
(Davis et al. 1966). An alternative approach, called the theory of serial judgment (Padgett
1980) draws in both satisficing (Simon 1957) and ambiguity in organizational choice
(March and Olsen 1976). The serial judgment budgeter also starts with an historically
given allocation outcome but then systematically adjusts this outcome by cycling through
discrete neighbouring alternatives. Empirical work by Padgett (1980) suggests that process
incrementalism is favoured when overall budget levels must be determined but that the
greater flexibility of serial judgment gives superior outcomes when the problem is allo-
cational change.
Incrementalism was a fair description of budgetary processes in HEIs until the 1970s.
Studies from that period demonstrate that, at least in the short and medium term, past
allocation was the best predictor for current level of allocation (Pfeffer and Moore 1980).
Since then, however, incrementalism has increasingly come under pressure as a budgeting
practice which does not allow efficient and strategic allocation of resources (Massy 1996a)
and there is some evidence that it has been replaced by other approaches—such as rule-
based allocation—both in HEIs and in public budgets (Wildavsky and Caiden 2004).
However, a closer empirical look might be useful to determine the extent to which
incrementalism remains active in some aspects of HEI budgets in general as well as
representing variations across individual HEIs as a function of jurisdiction or organiza-
tional characteristics.
The political model: budgeting as power-based negotiation
Borrowing from the work of both the Carnegie group and exchange theory, Pfeffer and
Salancik reject the view of organizations as characterized by a unique goal and a ordering
of preferences shared by all organizational participants; rather, organizations are
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recognized as coalitions of subunits with different objectives and preferences. The coali-
tional model argues that forms of decision based on generally agreed upon rules can be
employed only when there is a basic agreement on goals and casual connections between
actions and results. Soft decisions based on judgments and compromise among groups
pursuing competing interests become necessary to resolve internal goal conflicts (Pfeffer
and Salancik 1974). Introducing concepts from exchange theory (Emerson 1962) and
strategic contingency theory (Hickson et al. 1971) allowed Pfeffer and Salancik to then
push the critique of rational decision processes to incorporate the active use of power and
politics, particularly under circumstances in which there is high uncertainty about problems
and priorities.
The political nature of budgetary allocation in universities is considered functional to
their loosely coupled organization (Weick 1976) and to the uncertainty of technology
where rational approaches would be dysfunctional (Hardy 1988). These studies conceive
universities as loosely coupled coalitions of departments, which negotiate internal allo-
cation of resources, based on consideration of relative power. Since use of power has its
own costs—in terms of time and effort devoted to influence organizational decisions, this
approach predicts that use of power is more relevant in periods of scarcity, when conflicts
are more severe and departments need to make use of their power for getting resources. It
is also expected that in periods of scarcity powerful departments are able to increase their
share of resources, whereas in periods of abundance flatter allocations are adopted (Hills
and Mahoney 1978).
Following Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), organizations are
considered as open systems interacting with their environment and whose survival depends
from the ability of ensuring a continuous flow of resources; to cope with environmental
uncertainty organizations thus strive to have control on critical resources which are
essential for their survival. Hence, power is a function of the ability of subunits to ensure
critical resources for the organizations and, consequently, power-driven internal allocation
is also conductive to organizational success (Pfeffer and Moore 1980). Empirical studies
on US universities showed that a department’s power is essentially related to student
enrolments in their programs and their ability to provide external grants and contracts
(Salancik and Pfeffer 1974; Pfeffer and Moore 1980; Hills and Mahoney 1978).
Following studies broadened the notion of power by also considering centrality with
respect to organizational priorities, as well as the negotiating strategies of the heads of the
units as these are expected to be different between central and peripheral units (Dozier
Hackman 1985).
The contribution of this stream of research has been to provide a framework to
understand the role of power in budgetary negotiations within universities, to provide some
empirical evidence on its determinants and to demonstrate that departmental power can be
functional to organizational success as a result of its connection with the acquisition of
critical resources. In terms of an HEI’s relationships with its environment—as well as with
public policies—this drives our thinking toward budgeting as highly adaptive organiza-
tional behaviour, where HEIs move towards activities which facilitate the acquisition of
critical resources such as degree programs that will attract high number of students or
research concentrations that will attract third-party funding.
The neo-institutionalist approach: investigating the social order of budgeting
A third critique of the rational budgeting model rests on neo-institutionalist approaches to
organizational practices, which consider that legitimacy and conformity to social norms are
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required for organizational survival and that organizational practices are limited by socially
acceptable models rather than by considerations of efficiency (Meyer and Rowan 1977;
DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In public institutions like universities, budgeting systems are
one of the most visible organizational practices where pressures for conformity appear.
Empirically, there is evidence that HEIs tend to adopt the national allocation models for
their budgeting. ln Spain, different regional funding models have a remarkable impact on
internal budgeting procedures of the universities (Lopez Gonzales 2006). An Australian
study also shown that most universities there adopted the national allocation model as it
tended to solve internal power conflicts thanks to its legitimacy, even when the national
model was used only once in order to level off disparities between institutions (Watts
1982). Thus, this approach emphasizes the function of budgeting as a conformity action
driven by legitimacy rather than purely as a means of improving internal operations (as in
the rational approach) or to reward the most powerful units (as in the political approach).
Unlike other organizational practices which allow for decoupling between ceremonial
compliance and practical operations, budgeting systems have at the same time practical
implications. While playing the game of conformity towards the State in order to get more
resources, organizational actors need also to take into account the implications for the
internal repartition of resources and organizational power (Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988).
In the case of the University of Wisconsin they studied, the practical implications of
conforming to the budgeting categories imposed by the State in terms of funding volume
and internal repartition were felt to be so negative that the University openly defied the
existing social order of budgeting.
Case studies from a neo-institutionalist perspective demonstrate that, behind its
apparent rationality and objectivity, budgeting presents a set of socially accepted practices
which are largely infused by power relationships and the reproduction of control structures
inside the organization (Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988; Ezzamel 1994). Such institutional
entrepreneurship demonstrates a large deal of purposeful agency by organizational actors
in order to invent budget models and categories in pursuit of more resources. For example,
in his work on a UK university, Ezzamel (1994) showed how a group of actors were able to
mobilize resistance to the budgetary cuts proposed by the central administration thanks to
their specific competences in accounting, as well as through compliance to institutional
myths, such as academic freedom, job security and liberal work practices.
These studies also show the critical role of negotiations and power coalitions between
key actors during phases of reform. As a Swedish case study demonstrates, while appar-
ently simple in its principles, the introduction of new funding system at the national level
entailed a complex set of negotiations between political actors and the universities
themselves, where issues of internal accounting and budgeting became entrenched with
national allocation rules and change was possible only when stable coalitions of actors
were built (Modell 2006).
Appraisal and directions for future research
The literature review above highlights strengths and weaknesses of the different traditions
of study on budgeting in the context of higher education. These works provide substantial
advances on our understanding of the main perspectives on budgeting, namely resources,
actors and power, procedures and rules and, finally, social institutions. The main objective
of most of these studies was to test a specific theoretical perspective, thus contributing to
enrich our broad understanding of organizations and budgeting processes overall.
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The more focused agenda of higher education studies leads inevitably to a need to
address questions like how budgeting processes are related to other organizational char-
acteristics of HEIs, as well as to their change across time, the influence of changing
national funding systems on budgeting, and the impact of budgeting on HEI activities and
organizational success. Addressing empirically these questions is thus likely to require the
use and blending of different theoretical perspectives as researchers attempt to understand
how power and rules, resources and institutions coexist and coevolve in universities.
Second, the current scholarly debate on the organizational nature of HEIs tends to focus
on their complex and multifaceted nature, as well as on the fact that there is a great deal of
variation in organizational forms among individual HEIs related to their characteristics,
history and environmental conditions (Musselin 2007). National policy environments also
greatly differ in their characteristics and in the extent to which new rationales, like New
Public Management, have been introduced in higher education steering and funding (Ferlie
et al. 2008; Bleiklie et al. 2011b). In this context, there is limited justification for a single
theoretical framework for studying higher education budgeting.
Trying to integrate theoretical perspectives on HEIs in general would be a risky and
potentially meaningless task. However, performing this integration around some specific
research issues in budgeting seems more feasible (Covaleski et al. 2003). Specifically, in
the following sections of the paper, we focus on two main topics, namely: (1) analysing the
relationship between the transformation of HEIs toward formal organizations and strategic
actors and changes in budgeting and (2) understanding the mechanisms through which
budgeting in HEIs is influenced by changing environmental conditions and, especially, by
reforms in national funding systems.
As it will be clear from the following, these questions are essentially of a comparative
nature, meaning they require the systematic comparison of organizational and environ-
mental characteristics with budgeting processes across different HEIs and countries.
Organizational restructuring of HEIs and budgeting processes
A substantial body of literature has emerged in higher education studies concerning the
transformation of HEIs into formal organizations (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson 2000;
Kru¨cken and Meier 2006) and/or into strategic actors that are able to define their own goals and
strategies and to implement them through internal organizational processes (Whitley 2008).
We argue that budgeting is a central locus where these processes can be observed and
measured: first, control and management of financial resources is a central set of organi-
zational processes which are critical for organizational control; second, given its direct
connection with resources and organizational activities, budgeting is a place where the
practical implications of organizational change can be observed more directly than, for
example, looking at formal structures and strategic documents.
In the following section, we discuss these relationships with respect to three central
processes, namely the definition of organizational boundaries, the establishment of an
organizational hierarchy and, finally, the introduction of formal rules and procedures for
managing the organization.
Defining organizational boundaries in budgeting
The existence of an organizational budget—i.e. a clearly identified perimeter of which
expenditures (and revenues) belong to the organization—as well as the ability of the
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organization to manage them—should be considered as key presupposition of considering
an HEI as a formal organization. Accordingly, the study of budgeting is a good place to
assess the degree of definition (openness or permeability) of organizational boundaries.
In the European context, comparative studies document an increase in the autonomy of
HEI concerning financial matters in the recent years. Evidence includes the attribution of a
global budget, the transfer of responsibility to decide on the budget from the State to
university boards and the possibility of creating reserves and, to a lesser extent, to ability to
borrow money from financial markets (CHEPS 2010). Yet, these studies also display wide
differences between countries with respect to autonomy and there are still cases where the
final decision on the budget is a State competence. Availability of data is a further rough
indicator of autonomy in budgeting. In a recent European-level data collection on HEIs,
data on university budgets were collected for almost all countries except France, where the
tenured personnel are paid directly by the State and thus no aggregate figures on university
budgets are published (Daraio et al. 2011). Moreover, budgetary data usually cover only
personnel and current expenditures, while in many countries infrastructures and buildings
are owned by the State and the related expenditures are included in State accounts.
But even where the State does not have formal powers concerning budgets, substantial
influence may still be exerted through representation on university boards, informal ties
and negotiations.
We argue that most European HEIs are likely to be situated between the two extremes
of full control and responsibility on their budget on one side and a setting where both the
level and the repartition of the budget are fully determined by the State as a part of public
administration budgeting processes on the other. A more nuanced approach to the orga-
nizational nature of HEIs would then consider them as inherently open and penetrated
organizations (Bleiklie et al. 2011a) and use the analysis of budgeting as a tool to examine
the (varying) degree of control individual HEIs have on different organizational processes,
as well as the role of the State in organizational decisions.
New power balances: the coalition model of budgeting revisited
As shown in the literature review, a range of studies have focused on the relevance of
power to explain budgeting processes and have empirically demonstrated that power is
related to specific features, like the ability of subunits to acquire critical resources and their
efficacy regarding the strategic objectives of the organization. While most of these studies
are rooted in the coalition model of organizations, we suggest revisiting this approach in
light of the recent literature on organizational restructuring of HEIs and, especially, the
strengthening of the power of central bodies (Bleiklie et al. 2011a).
First, as power in budgeting displays direct implications in terms of available resources,
its distribution among organizational actors is likely to provide relevant information on the
overall organization of HEIs and relative importance of different actors—boards versus
rectors versus departments—which is less subject to the risk of showing ritual and cere-
monial behaviours than other sources of information (like organizational charts). Empir-
ically, this question can be addressed in two, largely complementary ways: first, by
analysing the formal processes of budgeting and the role of different actors (e.g. their
involvement in decision-making committees or who formally approves the budget) and,
second, asking organizational actors to specify which model best corresponds to their
representation of the current budgeting process (investigating the perceived power of
actors). Contrasting these two measures will also be relevant to understand to what extent
budgeting power is related to structural positions in contrast to political negotiations.
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Second, we suggest that differing degrees of centralisation of budgeting processes might
also drive different models of budgeting processes. It is useful in this respect to distinguish
between vertical power, i.e. the ability of the central administration to allocate resources
based on its own objectives, and horizontal power, i.e. the differential ability of depart-
ments to drive the allocation of resources as compared with other departments.
By crossing these two dimensions, four models of power in budgeting (Table 1) can be
recognized: the rational model applies where central administration decides on goals and
strategic priorities and sets the internal allocation of resources. The political model applies
when both central administration and departments have substantial power so that goals and
strategic priorities become subject to bargaining. When strong departments must reach
budgeting decisions under weak central control, conditions of organized anarchy may
prevail and process incrementalism might provide insights into the outcome. Finally, the
institutional model could be seen as a case where no organizational actor has adequate
power to drive the allocation of resources according to its own interests, but this is done
following broadly accepted conventions on how resources should be distributed. Where
there is substantial uncertainty in the environment due to a regulative or normative void,
the tendency of individual organizations to ‘play safe’ may yield mimetic responses
unconnected with organizational interests. Where strong social or professional norms
dominate, conformity arises from normative pressures. Finally, jurisdictions in which
regulation by the State is substantial may result in pressures to conformity that are truly
coercive in nature (de Boer et al. 2007).
In practical terms, the outcome of this discussion is that the good functioning of dif-
ferent budgeting models is related to specific conditions in terms of organizational struc-
ture, identity and balance of power and thus the key issue is the fit between the two, rather
than picking the theoretically best possible model. For instance, a negotiation-based model
will hardly be conductive to organizational success if departments are weak actors, i.e. not
able to pursue their own interests. Similarly, a rational model based on principal-agent
theory will fail if departments are so strong that the central power will not be able to
control departmental agency leading to a high risk of shirking and of coalitions between
departments jeopardizing linked incentive systems.
Analyzing rationalization processes in HEIs. Power-based versus rule-based allocation
Rationalization processes—i.e. the tendency for organizational decisions to be based on
generally-valid rules and procedures rather than on bargaining based on power—is con-
sidered as a central phenomenon in the transformation of HEIs into formal organizations
(Meyer and Rowan 1977). However, two issues are at stake here. First, we need to
understand the extent to which such processes have actually taken place. Second, we need
to understand the function of adopted rules in use, especially whether that function is
Table 1 Models of repartition of power
Strong departmental power Weak departmental power
Strong
central
power
Political model
Negotiation is important due to both parties
having significant power
Rational model
Centralised budgeting model with
bureaucratic processes
Weak
central
power
Garbage can model
Chaotic interaction of strong subunits without
centralized control. Incrementalism
Institutional model
Allocation dictated by social norms or by
external actors (e.g. the State)
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genuinely rational, only intendedly rational, i.e. subject to substantial limitation and
negotiation, or even primarily symbolic.
a. Empirically investigating the relative role of rules vs. power in current budgeting
practices, between the extremes of fully formalized systems and fully negotiated
systems, where no explicit and shared rules are in place is relevant for two reasons.
First, such an analysis can shed light on the extent of the rationalization processes in
HEIs overall and, second, it can illuminate the characteristics of the budgeting process,
as political and incremental budgeting are expected to display a lower level of
rationalization than rational (incentive-based) and institutions-based budgeting.
Two measures of these characteristics can be identified. First, the analysis of the for-
malization degree of budgetary allocation can be determined by examining the existence of
rules, the level of discretionary criteria concerning their application and, the extent to
which rules are public and known by organizational actors. Second, interviews of orga-
nizational actors can surface their representations of the relative role of rules vs. power in
budgeting practices (e.g. see Dozier Hackman 1985).
b. Budgeting theories are profoundly different in their interpretation of the mechanisms
driving the establishment of formal rules. Whereas rational models interpret rules as
tools to realize efficient allocation of resources, political economy models conceive
rules as instruments strategically used by actors in order to establish their power (card-
decking; McCubbins et al. 1987) and neo-institutionalist approaches conceive
rationalization as a ritual tool intended to legitimize the organization in the eyes of
the State and other relevant audiences (Meyer and Rowan 1977). More nuanced
studies in the neo-institutionalist tradition show that the introduction of budgeting
rules does not replace negotiations among actors, but rather frames them differently,
while rule systems—even if justified from apparently rational grounding—by and
large also technically mask their interests and power (Ezzamel 1994; Moll 2004).
While these issues are best addressed by longitudinal case studies, two simpler measures
can be devised which allow for systematic comparisons between HEIs. First, measures of
realised allocation outcomes can be examined identifying organizational actors who are
best served by current allocation rules—e.g. which faculties receive more funding per head
of student—to determine inconsistencies between organizational goals and the observed
distribution of resources. A second approach would involve asking organizational actors
about their perception of the function of rules, as well as which actors they believe are best
served by current allocation rules and procedures.
Responding to environmental changes
Theoretical approaches to budgeting fundamentally differ in accounts of organizational
responses to changes in the funding environment. Economics and resource dependency
theorists emphasize the selection of budgeting systems by managers as tools to acquire
additional resources or to improve efficiency, whereas neo-institutionalists accounts pre-
dict that HEIs adopt budgeting schemes based on conformity to social myths, norms and
regulatory pressures.
This question is relevant for understanding budgeting and its implications for organi-
zational behavior overall, but also for policy purposes, as reform in national funding
systems is largely used as an instrument to steer higher education under rationalist
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assumptions—e.g. to improve the efficiency of the system by introducing competition. In
this respect, changes in budgeting systems are seen as critical in order to transfer economic
incentives to the ‘‘production level’’ of HEIs (Liefner 2003).
In the following, we discuss some approaches that, while keeping the core insights of
neo-institutionalism, try to reconcile these with richer accounts of organizational agency
and provide a more balanced view of how organizations react both to their technical and
institutional environments (Kraatz and Zajac 1996). We organize the discussion in two
parts, first exploring the extent to which features of national funding systems generate
conformity and material pressures to HEIs concerning budgeting and b) considering which
factors might account for variations in responses among individual HEIs.
The structure of resource space and organizational responses in budgeting
As highlighted, national funding systems include both normative and technical dimensions,
as they introduce new principles for the allocation of funding—for example, emphasizing
efficiency and accountable use of money—while, at the same time, allocating resources
between funding streams and defining allocation criteria that impact resource availability
and critical dependencies, for example, by valuing differently categories of students or
modifying the share of third-party funding.
We note that markets themselves are socially constructed and institutionalized actor’s
spaces, where notions like rationality, economic value and efficiency are socially con-
structed (Biggart and Delbridge 2004; White 2002) and symbolic acts might generate
economic realities (Zajac and Westphal 2004). If the introduction of performance-based
allocation by a HEI is valued by students or private companies as a sign of efficiency and
drives an increase of the resources flow, it is rational to introduce it even if not justified in
terms of technical efficiency. Accordingly, funding systems should never be taken at their
face value only, but as they are interpreted and enacted by the actors controlling economic
resources.
To address the balance between conformity and resource acquisition, it is useful to
characterize funding systems along the following dimensions (Jongbloed 2008):
• The overall level of resources and its evolution over time.
• The level of centralization of decisions. This dimension characterizes which actors
have the power to decide on allocations and, accordingly, the importance of their
valuation for HEIs. In centralized systems, allocation is decided by the State (e.g.
through performance contracts), whereas in decentralized systems it is decided by
users. This includes third-party funding, but also core funding calculated on the basis of
other actors decisions (for example the number of students).
• The orientation of the funding decision toward inputs—for example, the costs of
education, as opposed to an orientation toward outputs—for example, the number of
degrees or research publications. These criteria generate a structure of the resource
space, but define as well norms and rules on how allocation of resources overall should
be based.
The strategic management literature (e.g. see Oliver 1991) argues that pressures for
conformity will be stronger if the discretional role of the State in allocating resources is
more important, for example, if a large share of the basic grant is attributed through
negotiations and based on historical criteria or if other relevant actors—e.g. students or
funding agencies—share the basic norms and rules for allocation of resources. On the
contrary, if a funding system is highly differentiated, meaning, for example, that different
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actors decide on allocation and that these actors have different views on how HEIs should
function and manage resources, then pressures for conformity will be reduced and,
accordingly, HEIs will have more freedom to shape their budgeting systems following
efficiency and resources acquisition approaches.
Further, it is expected that the degree of active endorsement of social norms by the
State, other public actors (for example, university associations) and experts in the field, in
providing clear guidelines on how budgeting should work as well as accounts of their
underlying rationales, will strengthen pressures for conformity, while scarce and dimin-
ishing resources will push HEIs to depart from social norms in order to get additional
resources.
Finally, we argue that the degree of alignment between normative and technical pres-
sures will be relevant in accounting for organizational responses. If adopting social norms
on budgeting does at the same time allow acquisition of additional resources—if, for
example, acquisition of third-party funding should be rewarded, but at the same time its
share in public funding is large and increasing, then more uniformity in HEI responses is
expected, while if the two pressures are divergent, then HEIs are likely to display different
responses according to their individual characteristics.
Predicting organizational responses
While earlier institutionalist literature tended to focus only on conformity and isomor-
phism, a rich stream of literature has more recently emerged in order to explain why
individual organizations respond differently to environmental pressures (see Greenwood,
Oliver, Sahlin and Suddaby 2008), integrating also insights from resource dependency
theory and the strategic management literature.
a. A structural approach considers that variations in organizational responses are
accounted for by the organizational position in the field. Some analyzed dimensions
are the identification of the lead organizations in a field which function as models to be
imitated, the role of network connections in diffusion of practices (board interlocks
studies; Davis and Greve 1997), and the importance of status, as there is evidence that
middle-status organizations are more subject to conformity pressures than those with
highest and lowest status (Han 1994). Most of these dimensions are likely to be
relevant for higher education, as for example, it would be expected that top-tier
universities are less prone to imitate national funding systems than middle-tier
universities.
b. An intra-organizational approach represents organizations as coalitions of actors with
different cultures and professional backgrounds, driving them to follow different
archetypes (or logics) in responding to environmental changes (Greenwood and
Hinings 1993). Accordingly, differences in power of these constituencies—and the
way changes in budgeting impact on their interests and power—might account for
differences in responses to external pressures (Delmas and Toffel 2009), for example
differences in the strength of management versus academics across HEIs would be
expected to explain responsiveness in introducing performance-based budgeting, at
least in HEIs where a political model of budgeting is relevant.
As this approach emphasizes the pluralistic character of institutional systems and the
existence of different institutional logics driving behaviour (Thornton and Ocasio 1999), a
related task would be to identify the main logics available in budgeting and their roots in
different societal domains (professions, markets, the State). Other approaches in this
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direction focus on the relevance of organizational identity, arguing that organizational
responses are affected by the degree of alignment between institutional pressures and the
history, social values and identity of organization itself. Indeed, a comparative study of
British HEIs displays that the selection of a resource allocation system is highly sensitive
to the characteristics of the organizational culture (Jarzabkowski 2002).
c. Strategic decisions under institutional constraints. Finally, the strategic management
literature emphasizes that, when faced with conformity pressures, organizations can
select different strategies, from compliance to defiance (Oliver 1991, 1997).
Accordingly, most criteria used to characterize conformity and technical pressures at the
system level apply also to the specific situation of individual HEIs (see Table 2).
Conclusions
There are many reasons why a better understanding of budgeting is of high relevance in the
context of Higher Education Studies.
First, budgeting is a central organizational activity wherein dimensions of internal
organization, normative systems and power balance interact to yield an allocation of
resources which is, at the same time, a set of practical actions that distribute resources,
cultural actions enacting social norms, and power actions establishing internal power
balances. Thus, investigating budgeting and its variations promises a better understanding
of the organizational nature of HEIs overall.
Second, budgeting plays a central role in the relationships between HEIs and their
environment and, following resource dependency theory, it can be argued that much of the
organizational behaviour of HEIs is driven by the quest for scarce resources. But this must
be framed in a broader conception of organizational responses than that provided by
Economics. Without understanding the full behavioural underpinning of budgeting, it
would be hardly possible to explain organizational responses to environmental changes.
Third, new policy rationales in higher education—like new public management—
increasingly put emphasis on funding instruments as a tool to steer at distance higher
education institutions. Therefore, an informed critique of the rationalist approach to
budgeting implicit in funding reforms will be critically important to our understanding of
Table 2 Factors predicting organizational responses based on conformity, respectively on acquisition of
critical resources
Pressure for conformity will be stronger if…
Coherence of
institutional system
Norms and rules for the allocation of funding are endorsed and supported by the
State and social actors
Dependency on the State The considered organization strongly depends on direct funding from the State
Active pressure from the
State
The State actively diffuses and promotes norms for allocation of resources
Pressure for non-compliance will be stronger if…
Scarce and diminishing
resources
The resources available for the organization are diminishing (as compared to
organizational tasks)
Acquisition of critical
resources
Compliance endangers the acquisition of resources considered critical for
organizational mission
Internal power balances Adopting the national rules for resources allocation would disadvantage the
most powerful departments and/or those central to organizational mission
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the nature of internal budgeting, particularly the balance to be struck among efficiency
considerations, the role of internal power and the quest for public legitimacy.
Despite a widespread disregard of budgeting issues in the higher education studies, our
literature review demonstrates that relevant building blocks can be derived from studies on
HEI budgeting done in other scholarly traditions, especially organization theory. However, in
order to provide answers to some central questions in the higher education field, two sig-
nificant steps forward are required. First, we must make an effort to bridge different theo-
retical traditions to provide meaningful approaches tailored to the complex reality of today’s
higher education institutions. Second, we must consider a shift in empirical strategy away
from the almost exclusive use of individual case studies as an empirical ground to validate
specific theoretical predictions towards comparative studies on larger samples of institutions
in order to analyse variations across individual organizations, time and national systems.
Acknowledgments This work has been funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation under the
European Science Foundation EUROHESC programme. The authors wish to thank for comments and
discussion their colleagues in the TRUE project, namely Ivar Bleiklie, Ju¨rgen Enders, Christine Musselin,
Jeroen Huisman, Barbara Kehm, Anto´nio Magalha˜es, Svein Michelsen, Nicoline Frølich, Stig Slipersæter,
Emanuela Reale, as well as three anonymous referees.
References
Amaral, A., Meek, & Larsen. (2003). The higher education managerial revolution?
Astley, W., & Zajac, E. (1991). Interorganizational Power and Organizational Design: Reconciling
Rational and Coalitional Models of Organization, 2(4), 339–411.
Becker, M. C. (2003). The concept of routines twenty years after Nelson and Winter (1982). A review of the
literature.
Biggart, N., & Delbridge, R. (2004). Systems of exchange. The Academy of Management Review, 29(1),
28–49.
Bleiklie, I., Enders, & Lepori. (2009). Some thoughts on the TRUE perspective.
Bleiklie, I., Enders, J., Lepori, B., & Musselin, C. (2011b). New public management, network governance
and the university as changing professional organization. In T. Christensen & P. Lægreid(Eds.) Ash-
gate Research Companion to New Public Management Aldershot: Ashgate.
Bleiklie, I., Enders, Lepori, B., & Musselin, C. (2011a). Universities as Penetrated Hierarchies. Organi-
zational Rationalization, Hierachization and Networking in Higher Education.
Bonaccorsi, A., & Daraio, C. (2007). Theoretical perspectives on university strategy. In A. Bonaccorsi & C.
Daraio (Eds.), Universities and strategic knowledge creation. Specialization and performance in
Europe (pp. 3–30). Cheltenham: Edwar Elgar.
Brunsson, N., & Sahlin-Andersson, K. (2000). Constructing organizations: The example of the public sector
reform. Organization Studies, 721–746.
CHEPS. (2010). Progress in higher education reform in Europe. Funding reform. Brussels: European
Commission.
Clark, B. R. (1983). The higher education system. Academic organization in cross-national perspective.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Covaleski, M. A., & Dirsmith, (1988). An institutional perspective on the rise, social transformation and fall
of a university budget category. Administrative Science Quarterly, 33(4), 562–587.
Covaleski, M. A., Evans, J. H., Luft, J. L., & Shields, M. D. (2003). Budgeting research: Three theoretical
perspectives and criteria for selective integration. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 15,
3–49.
Daraio, C., Bonaccorsi, A., Geuna, A., Lepori, B., et al. (2011). The European university landscape: A micro
characterization based on evidence from the Aquameth project. Research Policy, 40(1), 148–164.
Davis, O. A., Dempster, M. A. H., & Wildavsky, A. (1966). A theory of the budgetary process. The
American Political Science Review, 60(3), 529–547.
Davis, G. F., & Greve, H. R. (1997). Corporate elite networks and governance changes in the 1980s.
American Journal of Sociology, 103(1), 1–37.
de Boer, H., Enders, J., & Schimank, U. (2007). On the way towards new public management? The
governance of university systems in england, the netherlands, austria, and germany. In D. Jansen (Ed.),
76 High Educ (2013) 65:59–78
123
New forms of governance in research organizations—disciplinary approaches, interfaces and inte-
gration (pp. 137–154). Dordrecht: Springer.
Delmas, M., & Toffel, M. (2009). Organizational responses to environmental demands: Opening the black
box. Strategic Management Journal, 29(10), 1027–1055.
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective
rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147–160.
Dozier Hackman, J. (1985). Power and centrality in the allocation of resources in colleges and universities.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 30, 61–77.
Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14,
57–74.
Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence relations. American Sociological Review, 27(1), 31–41.
EUA European University Association. (2008). Financially sustainable universities. Towards full costing in
European Universities. Brussels: European University Association.
Ezzamel, M. (1994). Organizational change and accounting: understanding the budgeting system in its
organizational context. 15/2, 213–240.
Ferlie, E., Musselin, C., & Andresani, (2008). The steering of higher education systems: A public man-
agement perspective. Higher Education, 56(3), 325–348.
Ferris, J. M. (1992). A contractual approach to higher education performance: With an application to
Australia. Higher Education, 24(4), 503–516.
Gautier, A., & Wauthy, (2007). Teaching versus research: A multi-tasking approach to multi-department
universities. European Economic Review, 51, 273–295.
Greenwood, R., & Hinings, C. R. (1993). Understanding strategic change. The contribution of archetypes.
The Academy of Management Journal, 36(5), 1052–1081.
Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Sahlin, K., & Suddaby, R. (2008). Introduction. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K.
Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), Organizational institutionalism (pp. 1–46). London: Sage.
Han, S. (1994). Mimetic isomoprhism and its effects on the audit services market. Social Forces, 73(2),
637–664.
Hardy, C. (1988). The rational approach to budget cuts: One university’s experience. Higher Education,
7(2), 151–173.
Hickson, D. J., Hinings, C. R., Lee, C. A., Schneck, R. E., & Pennings, J. M. (1971). A strategic contin-
gencies’ theory of intraorganizational power. Administrative Science Quarterly, 16(2), 216–229.
Hills, F. S., & Mahoney, T. A. (1978). University budgets and organizational decision making. Adminis-
trative Science Quarterly, 23, 454–465.
Jarzabkowski, P. (2002). Centralised or decentralised? Strategic Implications of Resource Allocation
Models., 56, 5–32.
Johnes, G. (1999). The management of universities. Scottisch Journal of Political Economy, 46(5), 505–522.
Jongbloed, B. (2000). Spending strategies. A closer look at the financial management of the European
university 2000: European University Association.
Jongbloed, B. (2007). Reforming the Dutch academic research entreprise: Universities’ responses to project
funding and performance monitoring CHER Conference, Kassel.
Jongbloed, B. (2008). Creating public-private dynamics in higher education funding. A discussion of three
options. In J. Enders & B. Jongbloed (Eds.), public-private dynamics in higher education funding (pp.
113–138). Bielefeld: Transcript.
Jongbloed, B., & van der Knoop, H. (1999). Budgeting at the institutional level: Responding to internal
pressures and external opportunities. In B. Jongbloed, P. Maassen, & G. Neave (Eds.), From the eye of
the storm. Higher education’s chaning institutions (pp. 141–164). Dordrecht: Springer.
Kraatz, M. S., & Zajac, E. (1996). Exploring the limits of the new institutionalism: Causes and consequences
of illegitimate organizational change. American Sociological Review, 61(5), 812–836.
Kru¨cken, G., & Meier, F. (2006). Turning the university into an organizational actor. In G. S. Drori, J.
W. Meyer, & H. Hwang (Eds.), Globalization and organization. World society and organizational
change (pp. 209–240). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lascoumes, P., & Le Gales, (2007). Introduction: Understanding public policy through its instruments—
from the nature of instruments to the sociology of public policy instrumentation. Governance: An
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 20(1), 1–21.
Laudel, G. (2006). The art of getting funded: How scientists adapt to their funding conditions. Science and
Public Policy, 33(7), 489–504.
Lepori, B., Benninghoff, M., Jongbloed, B., Salerno, C., & Slipersaeter, S. (2007a). Changing models and
patterns of higher education funding: Some empirical evidence. In A. Bonaccorsi & C. Daraio (Eds.),
Universities and strategic knowledge creation. Specialization and performance in Europe (pp.
85–111). Bodmin, Cornwall: MPG Books Limited.
High Educ (2013) 65:59–78 77
123
Lepori, B., Dinges, M., Reale, E., Slipersaeter, S., Theves, J., & Van den Besselaar, P. (2007b). Comparing
the evolution of national research policies: What patterns of change? Science and Public Policy, 34(6),
372–388.
Liefner, I. (2003). Funding, resource allocation, and performance in higher education systems. Higher
Education, 469–489.
Lopez Gonzales, M. J. (2006). Towards decentralized and goal-oriented models of institutional resource
allocation: The Spanish case. Higher Education, 51(4), 589–617.
Massy, W. F. (1996a). A dynamic equilibrium model for university budget planning. Management Science,
23(3), 248–256.
Massy, W. F. (1996b). Resource allocation in higher education.
McCubbins, M., Noll, R., & Weingast, B. (1987). Administrative procedures as instruments of political
control. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 3(2), 243–277.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony.
The American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363.
Modell, S. (2006). Institutional and negotiated order perspectives on costs allocations: The case of the
Swedish university sector. 15(2), 219–251.
Moll, J. & Zahirul. (2004). Rational-legal budgeting, notions of legitimacy and power within a university
environment: A case study.
Musselin, C. (2007). Are universities specific organisations? In G. Kru¨cken, A. Kosmu¨tzky, & M. Torka
(Eds.), Towards a multiversity? Universities between global trends and national traditions (pp. 63–84).
Bielefeld: Transcript.
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. The Academy of Management Review,
16(1), 145–179.
Oliver, C. (1997). Competitive advantage: Combining institutional and resource-based views. Strategic
Management Journal, 18(9), 697–713.
Padgett, J. F. (1980). Managing gargabe can hierarchies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25(4), 583–604.
Pfeffer, J., & Moore, W. L. (1980). Power in university budgeting: A replication and extension. Adminis-
trative Science Quarterly, 25, 637–653.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1974). Organizational decision making as a political process: The case of a
university budget. Administrative Science Quarterly, 19(4), 135–151.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations. A resource dependence per-
spective. New York: Harper & Row.
Salancik, G., & Pfeffer, J. (1974). The bases and use of power in organizational decision making: The case
of a university. Administrative Science Quarterly, 19(4), 453–473.
Schick, A. (1985). University budgeting: Administrative perspective, budget structure, and budget process.
The Academy of Management Review, 10(4), 794–802.
Scott, W. R. (2001). Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks, California, USA: Sage.
Scott, W. R. (2008). Institutions and organizations. Ideas and interests. Thousands Oaks: Sage.
Simon, H. (1957). Models of man: Social and rational. New York: Wiley.
Thomas, H. (2000). Power in the resource allocation process: The impact of ‘‘rational’’ systems. 2, 127–137.
Thornton, P., & Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutional logics and the historical contingency of power in orga-
nizations: Executive Succession in the Higher Education Publishing Industry, 1958–1990. The
American Journal of Sociology, 105(3), 801–843.
Watts, E. W. (1982). Internal allocation of funds: Changes and challenges for Australian universities.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 12, 53–69.
Weick, K. (1976). Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. Administrative Science Quarterly,
21(1), 1–19.
White, H. C. (2002). Markets from networks. Socioeconomic models of production. Princeton, New Jersey,
USA: Princeton University Press.
Whitley, R. (2008). Constructing universities as strategic actors: Limitations and variations. In L. Engwall &
D. Weaire (Eds.), The university in the market (pp. 23–37). Colchester: Portland Press Limited.
Wildavsky, A. (1964). The politics of the budgetary process. Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown and Company.
Wildavsky, A. (2002). Budgeting. A comparative theory of budgetary processes. New Brunswick: Trans-
action Publishers.
Wildavsky, A., & Caiden, N. (2004). The new politics of the budgetary process.
Williamson, O. E. (2000). The new institutional economics: Taking stock, looking ahead. Journal of
Economic Literature, 38(3), 595–613.
Zahirul, H. (2006). Methodological issues in accounting research. Theories, methods and issues.
Zajac, E., & Westphal, J. (2004). The social construction of market value: Institutionalization and learning
perspectives of stock market reactions. American Sociological Review, 69(3), 433–457.
78 High Educ (2013) 65:59–78
123
